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disentanglement of the backlog of family partnership disputes, a result effected
by encouraging settlement of pending disputes and by discouraging appeals and
reversals.4
SUCCESSION TO TRUSTEESHIP UPON CONSOLIDATION
OR MERGER OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY
While in most jurisdictions all rights and obligations of consolidating or
merging corporations are automatically transferred to the resulting corpora-
tion, some states condition succession to trusteeships upon court approval.'
This requirement stems from the rule against delegating trusteeships, the emerg-
ing corporation being considered a legal entity different from the appointed
trustee.2 The requirement is said to be justified by the reliance of a settlor on
the trustee's personal interest in the beneficiaries, business judgment, and finan-
cial responsibility. Although sound when applied to natural trustees, such rea-
soning seems inappropriate when the trustee is a corporation.3 The size and ac-
tivity of corporate trustees belie the notion that there is anything personal
about their administration of trusts. 4 As for faith in business judgment, limita-
tions imposed by statute and judicial standards of prudence leave little scope
48 Since the Culbertson case makes the ultimate issue one of intent, necessarily a finding of
fact, it could be argued that the decision provides few grounds upon which an appellate court
could reverse a Tax Court decision. However, the appellate courts accepted the Tax Court
interpretation of the Tower case, and it would seem that only findings of fact were involved
prior to the Culbertson case; hence perhaps no improvement can be expected. At least it can
be hoped that more respect will be given to Tax Court findings in view of the finality which the
Supreme Court indicated should be accorded them.
z Unless, of course, the trust instrument provides otherwise. Generally, consult 3 Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees § 531 (rev. ed. 1946); Fruchtman, The Effect of Merger or Consolidation
on the Succession of Corporate Trustees, 22 Ky. L. J. 378 k[934); Bogert, Some Recent De-
velopments in the Law of Trusts, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 749, 757-65 (1929). Twenty states have
statutes explicitly providing for automatic succession to fiduciary relationships by the result-
ing corporation. 3 Bogert, op. cit. supra at 325 n. 15. The court approval requirement is the
result of judicial limitation of consolidation statutes providing in general terms for automatic
transfer of rights and obligations. Compare Stevens v. First Nat. Bank, I73 Ga. 332, 16o
S.E. 243 (1931); Hofheimer v. Seaboard Cit. Nat. Bank, x54 Va. 392, 153 S.E. 656 (193o);
Commonwealth-Atlantic Nat. Bank of Boston, petitioner, 249 Mass. 44o, N44 .E. 443 (1924).
For an exhaustive tabulation and analysis of state statutes, see Fruchtman, op. cit. supra
at 389-99. It is now standard practice to provide in the trust instrument for automatic suc-
cession by the resulting corporation in the event of consolidation or merger. 3 Bogert, op. cit.
supra at 325; i Scott on Trusts § 96.7 (1939).
2 Cases cited note i supra; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 531 at 322-25 (rev. ed. 1946).
3 See First Nat. Bank of Chattanooga v. Harry E. Chapman Co., i6o Tenn. 72, 22 S.W.
2d 245 (1929); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Zinser, 264 Ill. 31, 1o5 N.E. 718 (i914); In re
Bergdorf's Will, 2o6 N.Y. 309, 99 N.E. 714 (1912). But see Fruchtman, op. cit. supra note i,
at 394-96; Bogert, Some Recent Developments in the Law of Trusts, 23 Ill. L. Rev. 749, 765
(1929).
4 In 1947, 2,976 American companies controlled $36,i62,I6i,448 of personal trust property,
the average being about $12 million per company. Stephenson, Trust Business in the United
States, i947, 86 Trusts & Estates 2o6 (1948). See Institutionalized Trusteeship, 58 Yale L. J.
024 (949).
for genuine discretionary activity.s And the supervisory powers exercised by
the Comptroller of the Currency over national banks; and by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation, the federal reserve banks, and state agencies
over state banking and trust institutions, provide a more effective safeguard for
trust funds than any private or judicial appraisal could be expected to achieve.6
Finally, a settlor's choice of trustee based on the small differences which do ex-
ist between available corporations can be nullified by changes in trustee policy
or personnel which do not affect the corporate entity.7
In those situations where the merger or consolidation is merely a paper trans-
action, and the actual organizational machinery which has been administering
the trust remains unchanged, the settlor's judgment in choosing a trustee would
be positively disregarded were the trusteeship diverted from the new or sur-
viving corporation. However, no court applying the rule against automatic
succession has made an exception in such a case.
Many of these transactions have taken place as a result of the changing re-
lationship of national banks to the trust business. Because the administration
of trusts was not an important adjunct of the banking business when the Na-
tional Banking Act' was passed in 1864, no authority was given national banks
to become trustees. Subsequently they found this lack of authority a handicap
in their competition with trust companies, which were expanding into the gen-
eral banking field.9 Some national banks overcame the disability by setting up
trust affiliates incorporated under state law.1' Although the Federal Reserve
s Some statutes limit trust investments to those specified unless broader powers are given
by the trust instrument. Where the statutory list is merely advisory, unlisted investments
are not unauthorized per se, but the dangers of malfeasance suits for losses on investments
render very attractive the presumption of soundness which attaches to "legal" investments.
Other statutes merely restate the common-law standard of the reasonable and prudent trustee.
See LegalLists in Trust Investment, 49 Yale L. J. 891 (i94o); Standards of Care for Corporate
Trustees, 16 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 579 (1949).
6 4 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 98o (rev. ed. 1946). While the primary purpose of super-
vision and examination is to discover dangers to the solvency of the institution, trust depart-
ment procedure and accounts are also investigated for violations of regulations governing
investment policy, accounting methods, segregation of trust assets, and self-dealing. Periodical
inspections supplement the one made when the corporation is first granted power to accept
trusts.
7 Even in the event of a merger, the trusteeships formerly held by the "surviving" corpora-
tion are not vacated, since its corporate entity continues. Yet the surviving corporation may
have undergone quite as drastic a transformation as one whose corporate entity has been dis-
solved. 3 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 531 at 324 (rev. ed. 1946).
$ 13 Stat. 99 (1864), as amended, t2 U.S.C.A. c. 2 (945).
9 See Smith, Development of Trust Companies in the United States 33 2-38, 345-51 (2928),
for an analysis of the competition between the banks and the insurgent trust companies for
general banking business between 1865 and 19ii. Two main advantages enjoyed by the trust
companies were freedom from reserve requirements and greater scope in making loans, par-
ticularly in the real estate field. Many states had qualified their banks as trustees, thereby
further undermining the competitive position of national banks.
10 Herrick, Some Present Day Tendencies in Trust Company Management, 79 Bankers'
Magazine (N.Y.) 350-52 (i909).
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Board has had authority since 1913 to grant trusteeship powers to national
banks," it was not until the McFadden Act12 of 1927 that the banks were al-
lowed to consolidate or merge with their trust affiliates. By this act Congress
attempted to change corporate entity theory in consolidations involving na-
tional banks, by providing that the corporate existence of the constituent banks
should be continued in the emerging corporation. Furthermore, the statute ex-
plicitly stated that the resulting company was to succeed automatically to all
trusteeships held by the component institutions. However, because of the con-
stitutional doctrine that the regulation of property in trust is a local matter,
this provision was held to govern only where not contrary to state law. 3
This is the background to De Korwin v. First National Bank of Chicago,'4 re-
cently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. First National
had acquired a trust department by incorporating the First Trust & Savings
Bank under Illinois law. In his will, Otto Young, an early director of First Na-
tional, appointed the state affiliate to the trusteeship of his estate. After probate
and acceptance of the trust, the trustee was consolidated with another Illinois
trust company, forming the First Union Trust & Savings Bank. As had been
the case with First Trust & Savings Bank, the stock of the new company was
owned by the shareholders and voted by the officers of First National. After
the McFadden Act, First Union was consolidated with First National. The trust
organization was in no way affected by these changes in its legal identity. From
the time of the original appointment it has continued to administer the trust
as a department of the First National Bank.
In a suit by the heirs of certain trust remaindermen, the district court de-
cided that the succession to the trusteeship after the first consolidation was un-
authorized, and held First National accountable from the date of the succession
for all losses the trust fund had sustained and for all fees gained from its admin-
istration. s Had the court of appeals agreed that the succession was improper, it
might still have questioned the liability imposed. The depression losses which
formed the bulk of the damages were not caused by the failure to secure formal
appointment, the only blameworthy conduct ascribed to the trustees; 6 nor did
Ix Federal Reserve Act of 1913, § ii(k), 38 Stat. 251, 262 (1913), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 248(k) (1945).
22 44 Stat. 1225 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 34a (1945).
's Ex parte Worcester Nat. Bank, 279 U.S. 347 (1929). Thirteen states have enacted
statutes expressly providing for automatic succession to trusteeships in state-national con-
solidations. 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 531, at 327 n. 24 (rev. ed. 1946).
'4 179 F. 2d 347 (C.A. 7th, 1949), reversing 84 F. Supp. gi8 (Ill., ig4g).
s De Korwin v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 84 F. Supp. 918 (Ill., 1949).
Ad Compare Springfield Nat. Bank v. Couse, 288 Mass. 262, 192 N.E. 529 k1934), where an
executor was not required to account de son tort for acts done as trustee before the overt act
necessary to becoming legal trustee, namely, acceptance by the probate court of its accounts as
executor. Compare Liability of Trustee in the Absence of Causal Relation between Wrong-
doing and Loss, 5o Harv. L. Rev. 317 (I936). Failure to earmark trust securities as held in
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this failure render the trustees' services any less valuable.' 7 However, the court
of appeals found it unnecessary to consider this problem, for it decided that the
trusteeship transfer was valid.
The first consolidation was effected under Section 12 of the Illinois Banking
Act,' 8 which provides that "the rights of persons in any particular" shall not be
affected by such a transaction. The only case applying this provision to a fiduci-
ary relationship was Chicago Title &' Trust Co. v. Zinser.19 There a trust com-
pany which had been named executor in a will was consolidated prior to the
death of the testator. The appointment of the resulting corporation as executor
was upheld' in a decision which permitted it to enforce specifically a contract
to purchase estate property. The Illinois Supreme Court said:
The rule [that a trustee cannot delegate his authority] cannot be applied to the case
of a corporation, because the element of trust in the judgment and discretion of an in-
dividual is entirely wanting.... Etta Nelson, in naming the Real Estate Title and
Trust Company as executor and trustee, knew that its directors, officers, and stock-
holders might change from time to time, and that the statute authorized ...
the consolidation of the corporation with any other corporation then existing or that
might thereafter be organized. She therefore contemplated that these changes might
occur.
The district court in De Korwin v. First National Bank distinguished the
Zinser case on the facts, emphasizing the provision in Young's will for court ap-
pointment of a successor trustee with beneficiary approval "[in the event that
said trustee [First Trust & Savings Bank] shall refuse to qualify or act, or fur-
ther act, as trustee under this will .... ,,2, The court argued that the testator
had meant this clause to govern in the event of consolidation. However, this
does not seem a sufficiently clear expression of intent to warrant an exception
to the general principle of automatic succession implied in the Zinser case.22
trust has not invariably resulted in liability for losses on them. Chapter House Circle of the
King's Daughters v. Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 12I Conn. 558, i86 Atl. 543 (I936).
"In Pease v. Kendall, 391 ll. 193, 63 N.E. 2d 2 (1945), a trustee de tort son (his appoint-
ment was void for lack of notice) was allowed fees for his services as trustee.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. (949), c. 16j, § 12. 19 264 Ill 31, io5 N.E. 718 (1914).
20 In the De Korwin case, the court of appeals argued that this decision, affirming the ap-
pointment of the consolidated corporation as executor rather than as administrator, stands
for the proposition that a testator naming a corporate trustee also names all its successors by
consolidation or merger. In support is Sartain v. Davis, 323 Ill. 269, 154 N.E. ioi (1926),
which states that the probate court may appoint as executor only persons so designated in the
will.
21 84 F. Supp. 918, 934 (Ill-, 1949).
-The rule that the author of a trust has the right to determine the onlylegal method in which
a vacancy in the trusteeship may be filled was established in cases involving natural trustees.
See French v. Northern Trust Co., 197 Ill. 30,38, 64 N.E. ioS, 107 (1902); Estate of Beckwith
v. Cooper, 258111. App. 411, 418 (ig3o); Equitable Trust Co. v. Fisher, io6 Ill. 189, 195 (1882).
There has been no Illinois case in which this rule was applied to a vacancy caused by the
consolidation or merger of a corporate trustee.
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The contrary opinion of the court of appeals was also based on testator in-
tent. In holding that the trusteeship was not vacated by the first consolidation,2
the court said: "[I]nasmuch as the testator was presumed to know that con-
solidation might occur, he necessarily contemplated that it would occur and
that, when consolidation did occur, he intended what the laws says [sic], name-
ly, that the functions of the merging corporations would pass to the new cor-
poration." In ruling on the consolidation with First National, the court extend-
ed this presumption of knowledge and intent to include the McFadden Act, en-
acted after the testator's death. This extension exposes the presumption as
mere judicial gesturing, which might well have been dispensed with in favor of
a clear statement of the policy considerations underlying this sound decision.
STANDING TO ATTACK SPENDTHRIFT TRUST
CREATED BY BENEFICIARY
"Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts are permitted, the settlor
cannot create a spendthrift trust for his own benefit."' This general precept cer-
tainly means that the settlor's creditors2 and probably his voluntary alienees3
can reach the settlor's interest in such a trust, but it has not been entirely clear
whether the settlor himself or another beneficiary4 could attack the trust on the
theory that it is contrary to public policy. While Professor Bogert does state
that such a spendthrift trust "should be subject to attack by the creditors
only,"s most of the other authorities do not specifically mention the settlor or
beneficiary in this connection. Moreover, ambiguous statutes have beclouded
the issue, 6 and the question has rarely arisen before the courts.7
2"The court maintained that the appointed trustee lived on in the consolidated corporation,
and only died with respect to "formal legal existence." While manipulation of the various
aspects of the concept of corporate entity have been a traditional part of the law of this
subject, the above exposition would seem to be unavailable in Illinois, where the cases, includ-
ing the Zinser case, have invariably held the constitutent corporate entities to be dissolved
on consolidation. See Scheidel Coil Co. v. Rose, 242 Ill. 484, go N.E. 221 (igo9); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Doyle, 259 Ill. 489, 102 N.E. 790 (1913).
x Scott, Trusts § 156 (1939). Such a trust is sometimes said to be "invalid." rig A.L.R. 35
(1939).
2 Mackason's Appeal, 42 Pa. 330 (1862); Rest., Trusts § i56(e) (1935); i Scott, Trusts § i56
(1939); 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 224 (1935).
3 Byrnes v. Comm'r, iio F. 2d 294 (C.C.A. 3d, i94o); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Kennard, i N.Y.S. 2d 369 (i937); Rest., Trusts § i56(e) (1935); 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
§ 224, at 734 (1935). Contra: Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. io6, 113 N.W. 787 (1907); see ri9
A.L.R. 37 (i935); 138 A.L.R. 1323 (1942).
4 Or perhaps the sittlor himself in his capacity as a beneficiary.
s i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 224, at 734 (1935).
6 See text at note 17 infra.
7 Perhaps this is because few settlors ever thought they could succeed in getting the courts
to allow them to attack the trust for an invalidity which the settlors themselves created.
